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Last-Hired, First-Fired:
Discriminatory or Sacrosanct?
If God cannot change yesterday then we judges can hardy be
expected to do it.'
I.

Background

On July 2, 1965, title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
became effective. The statute outlawed employment discrimination
on the bases of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex by all
employers of more than fifteen people and by all labor unions. As a
result, the composition of the American work force has been visibly
altered in the last decade. After many years of struggle against job
discrimination, minorities and women were hired and promoted to
positions from which they previously had been excluded. The slowly
ending recession of recent years, however, has forced many businesses
to lay off employees to bring costs in line with reduced sales and
shrinking profits. These layoffs seriously threaten employees recently
hired under affirmative action programs, who are finding their hardwon gains endangered by the "last-hired, first-fired" doctrine.3 A
1. United States v. Jacksonville Term. Co., 451 F.2d 418, 461 (5th Cir. 1971),
(Coleman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970). Section 703(a) of this title states,
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-

cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a). Section 703(c) provides similar prohibitions against unions. Id. §
2000e-2(c).
3. The recession arrived during the evolution of a law enacted in an era of
growth and boom psychology. Equal opportunity is a full-employment issue. "In
this slumping economy, however, the other side of the job-bias coin is face up.
Layoffs threaten most seriously those employees who were hired under 'affirmative
action' programs."
Hyatt, Who's Next? Courts' Protection Against lob Layoffs
Sought by Minorities, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1974, at 1, col. 1. "In places where
minorities and women may represent only 10 to 12 percent of the employees we are
finding they represent 60 to 70 percent of those laid off." NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1974,

at 72.

complex and emotional issue has arisen: Is this doctrine discriminatory in light of federal equal employment legislation?
Minority and women employees are seeking legal protection
from layoffs. They contend that layoffs based on length of service
perpetuate past discrimination by threatening newly won jobs of
groups long denied equal opportunity. These groups have been
unable to accrue -the necessary seniority to withstand layoffs. Labor
unions, however, defend as sacrosanct the seniority system ,that has
protected workers from their employers. 4 Meanwhile, tension among
employees builds while the issue smolders5 and employers, caught
between two poles, are forced to make decisions that could result in
costly payments of back wages to persons wrongfully laid off. "In
this precarious spot. . . business would welcome almost any formula
that allowed layoffs without compromising its E.E.O. [Equal Employment Opportunity] obligations or its obligations to organized
labor." 6
At present, however, the formulas are ambiguous. While civil
rights law is well defined in the area of hiring and promotions, legal
guidelines regarding layoffs are only now being formulated. 7 This
comment will analyze the last-hired, first-fired issue by focusing on
the congressional history of title VII and judicial decisions interpreting the Act.
4. Totenberg, Recession's Special Victims, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1975, § 4, at
1, col. 1 (city ed.):
Conversely, organized labor has used the last-hired, first-fired principles as a cardinal rule-something it fought hard to get and is not about
to give up. It is the heart of the seniority system. L.I.F.O. [last in, first
out] was incorporated into labor contracts in the 1930's to protect workers
from their bosses. The clause was intended to remove from management
the discretion of determining who would be let go in hard times.
5. Bender, Job Discrimination,10 Years Later, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, §
3, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.); Holsendolph, Layoff and the Civil Rights of Minorities,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1975, at 17, col. 1 (city ed.). These articles reveal the fears of
many people that the combination of layoffs, fewer jobs, and racial overtones may
produce racial conflict similar to that recently experienced in Boston over school
busing.
6. Holsendolph, Layoff and the Civil Rights of Minorities, N.Y. Times, Jan.
29, 1975, at 17, col. 1 (city ed.).
7. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976);
Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.
1975); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 96 S. Ct. 2196 (1976); Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974); Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F. Supp. 1136
•(E.D. Mich. 1975); Loy v. City of Cleveland, 8 FEP CASES 614 (N.D. Ohio),
dismissed as moot, 8 FEP CASES 617 (N.D. Ohio 1974). The federal government's
position also is unclear. John Powell, former Chairman of the EEOC, is sympathetic
to minority employees' predicament. William Kilberg, solicitor of the United States
Department of Labor, however, disagrees with the EEOC's stand and maintains that
employment seniority is "not an evil concept." See NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1974, at 72;
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, § 3, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.); Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1974, at 1,
col. 1.
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II.

Statistical Inferences: An Inadequate Analytical Tool

Passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act produced a flurry of court
actions to open up previously all-white, all-male employment opportunities. Courts held that active discrimination and present effectuation of past discrimination were both prohibited by title VII. In
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' the Supreme Court stated,
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . .
was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. Under
the Act, practices, procedures or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.9

Following Griggs courts often have focused on employment
statistics in determining whether an employment opportunity is frozen. When disproportionately few minority employees appeared within a particular work force, courts have found a "statistical inference"
of discrimination. 10 Similarly, opponents of the seniority system cite
unemployment statistics to display a statistical inference that the lasthired, first-fired doctrine discriminates against minorities in violation
of title VII. 1" Implementation of the system, they contend, even if
neutral on its face, results in "the elimination of gains in minority and
female employment that have been made in the last decade and a
return to the status quo ante-employment preferences based on
race and sex."' 2
Although this argument is logically consistent, blind adherence
to statistical inferences replaces analysis with expediency. A dispro8. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
9. Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
10. Several courts also have held that a statistical disparity among races within
a work force creates a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. Long v. Sapp,
502 F.2d 34, 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d
211, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d
1364, 1370-72 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 120'
(5th Cir. 1972). Contra, United States v. Jacksonville Term. Co., 451 F.2d 418,
441-42 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972). In Jacksonville the Fifth
Circuit held that statistical evidence, while relevant, does not necessarily make a
prima facie case. Congressional discussion favors this view. 110 CONG. REc. 7213

(1964).
11. Schaefer v. Tarnian, 394 F. Supp.
Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America,
La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
12. Brief for Appellees at 10, Watkins
America, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975). In

1136 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Watkins v.
369 F. Supp. 1221, 1226, 1231 (E.D.
v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of
Brief for Ohio Civil Rts. Comm'n as

portionate impact upon minority workers may show actionable discrimination, but it need not dictate such a finding. Employment cases
that used statistical information to draw discriminatory inferences did
so when the statistics indicated a continuance of discriminatory behavior."l In industries in which discriminatory employment practices
have been terminated for many years, however, absolute trust is
improperly placed in disparate statistical figures.14 Use of statistical
information showing racial imbalances to prove that current layoffs
violate title VII oversimplifies a complex issue by focusing on gross
statistical effects without a corresponding legal analysis of the underlying causes of layoffs within the guidelines of title VII. This statistic-oriented approach is based on the
belief that ,any policy-no matter how bona fide-which stands
in the way of full statistical parity for blacks [or women] as a
class must be abolished without regard to the rights of other persons who would be adversely affected. 13
In light of congressional intent and judicial interpretation of title VII,
this posture is untenable.

III.

Congressional Intent

Plant seniority' 6 rules discriminate on the basis of length of
service, favoring older employees to new ones. Discrimination in this
sense, however, does not constitute a title VII violation. The Act
7
prohibits racial, religious, national origin, or sex discrimination.1
Congress did not outlaw discrimination based on length of service. In
fact, it sought to preserve it.'
Congress intended title VII to be
prospective, rather than retrospective, in operation.' 9 A compromise
Amicus Curiae at 10, Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 516
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975), the authors argued,
But that system serves to do more than merely 'freeze' the status quo; the
operation of the system is a step backward, to the point where the company
is now operating with a virtually all white work force as it did prior to
1963. The seniority system, therefore, must be modified because of its adverse impact on blacks.
13. Cases cited note 10 supra.
14. Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 516 F.2d 41 (5th
Cir. 1975). For five years between 19:67 and 1971, Continental Can took progressive
steps to make employment opportunities available to previously excluded groups. The
court noted that there had been no finding of discrimination on the part of
Continental Can since 1965. Id. at 46.
15. Reply Brief for Appellants at 4, Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
16. Plant or employment seniority is defined as the total length of service to an
employer regardless of the position in which it is earned. Departmental or job
seniority is defined as the length of time one has served in a particular department or
position within a company.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970); see note 2 supra.
18. See note 28 and accompanying text infra.
19. "No one can quarrel with the broad proposition that Title VII operates only
prospectively." Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416
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was reached between two conflicting goals: elimination of employment discrimination and protection of accrued seniority rights. Within
this framework Congress constructed a legislative history 2° to insure
that plant seniority would not be jeopardized.
Title VII was first reported as part of House Resolution 7152.21
Throughout the debates following introduction of the bill, Congressmen voiced concern that title VII might operate to destroy seniority
rights accrued by employees over many years. 22 Advocates of the bill
repeatedly assured their colleagues that these fears were groundless.
Chairman Celler of the House Judiciary Committee observed that the
bill would not destroy "worker seniority systems and employee rights
2"
vis-a-vis the union and the employer.
When the Senate began to consider H.R. 7152,4 similar
statements were placed in the CongressionalRecord. Senator Humphrey began the debate by emphasizing that "It]his bill is not an
instrument to abolish seniority or unions themselves, as some have
charged." 2 5 Senator Clark addressed the congressional fears in a
memorandum:
Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a
'last hired, first fired' agreement a Negro happened to be 'lasthired,' he can still be 'first-fired' as long as it is done
because
26
of his status as 'last-hired' and not because of his race.
F.2d 980, 987 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); accord, Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 795 (4th Cir. 1971).
20. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 431, 444
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Vaas]: "Seldom has similar legislation been debated
with greater consciousness of the need for 'legislative history,' or with greater care in
the making thereof, to guide the courts in interpreting and applying the law." Contra,
Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1598, 1609-10 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cooper & Sobol].
21. H.R. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess..(1963).
22. Senator Hill expressed apprehension that title VII would undermine seniority rights. Senator Dirksen also questioned the effect of the bill. See 110 CONG.
REC. 7207, 7217 (1964) (Senator Clark rebuttal); Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1260, 1272 (1967).
23.
110 CONG. REc. 1518 (1964).
24. The debate began on March 9, 1964. Senators Humphrey and Kuchel were
selected as bipartisan leaders to speak in favor of H.R. 7152 and explain its
provisions. Bipartisan captains were picked to explain each title in detail. Senators
Clark and Case were the captains responsible for title VII. Meanwhile, Senators
Dirksen, Mansfield, Humphrey, and Kuchel were working in private conference to
reach an agreement on amendments to the bill that would assure its passage. Vaas,
supra note 20, at 444-45.
25. 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964). Senator Kuchel echoed Humphrey's assertion. Id. at 6563-64.
26. 110 CoNG. REc. 7217 (1964).

The most persuasive and emphatic statement about title vIrs effect
on seniority rights, however, was a memorandum prepared by the
United States Department of Justice.
First it has been asserted that Title VH would undermine
rights of seniority. This is not correct. Title VII would have
no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect.
If, for example, a collective bargainingcontract provides that in
the event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off
first, such a provision would not be affected in the least by Title
VI. This would be true even in the case where owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers
had more seniority than Negroes.... [I]n the ordinary case, as-

suming that seniority rights were built up over a period of time
during which Negroes were not hired, these rights would not be
set aside by the taking effect of Title VII. .

.

. Any difference

in treatment based on established seniority rights would
27 not be
based on race and would not be forbidden by the Title.
These qualifying statements subsequently were codified in section 703(h), an amendment to the bill expressly stating that plant
seniority rights would not be affected by title VII. Section 703(h)
provides in part,
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system.

. .

provided that such differences are

not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin .... 28
The Senators who prepared the amendment 29 were the group responsible for repeated assurances that plant seniority rights would not be
altered by title VII.1° To conclude that section 703(h) was not a
logical extension of previous congressional expressions, one must
believe "that the same Senators who continually expressed their position that plant seniority rights should be preserved intended to countermand their assurances by the adoption of Section 703(h).'
27. Id. at 7207 (emphasis added). The Clark-Case memorandum, id. at 7213,
states in part,
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business
has been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working
force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be
simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not
be obliged--or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes,
or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to
give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired

earlier.
28.
29.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) (emphasis added).
Vaas, supra note 20, at 445.

30. See note 24 supra.
31. Brief for Appellant at 30, Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of
America, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Nevertheless, some opponents3 2 of the last-hired, first-fired doctrine have disregarded congressional intent, arguing that remarks
about seniority rights were nullified by the addition of section 703(h)
to title VII.33 They contend that it is "proper to rely more heavily on
the language of Section 703(h), and less on the earlier legislative
statements than might otherwise be appropriate in interpreting the
Act on questions of seniority."3 4
35
In Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America
Judge Cassibry, speaking for the district court, construed the congressional statements as a proposal for total protection of any existing
seniority system. Since courts have rejected a total exemption, 36
however, Judge Cassibry concluded that the statements have no interpretive value.37
Judge Cassibry's opinion misconstrued congressional intent. The
statements made during the debate over title VII did not mandate
blanket protection for all existing seniority rules. In fact, blanket
protection was rejected by the House of Representatives.3 8 Throughout the debates the Senators were concerned with clearly establishing
that title VII was to operate neither preferentially39 nor retrospectively, but rather was to operate only prospectively by requiring nondis32. Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Watkins v.
Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974),
rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
33. Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 369 F. Supp. 1221,
1228 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
34. Id. Less important arguments contradicting the legislative history are
stated in Cooper & Sobol, supra note 20, at 1611-14.
35. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1968).
37. Judge Cassibry stated,
Blanket statements were made to the effect that the bill would not have any
effect on seniority. But upon consideration of the effects of seniority systems on the opportunities of black workers, where there is a backdrop of
past discrimination, the courts have enforced the general prohibition against
racial discrimination set forth in Section 703, and ruled that the Act can
have an effect on seniority. The greater similarity of the examples set forth
in the Clark statements to the facts of this case does not alter the overriding reality that the statements themselves have been rejected as an interpretive guide.
369 F. Supp. at 1229.
38. 110 CONG. REc. 2728 (1964).
39. Commenting on the effect of title VII, Senator Humphrey stated,
Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is
nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court
to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial
'quota' or to achieve a certain racial balance.
Id. at 6549.

criminatory access to employment opportunity in the present 'and
future.40 An existing seniority system was to be protected if it did
not discriminate or prevent access to employment opportunity. On

the other hand, "if the seniority rule itself [were] discriminatory, it
would be unlawful under Title VII."' 4 1 Additionally, some courts
have stricken or modified seniority systems that created barriers to
employment opportunity.4" Nevertheless, these holdings do not undermine the usefulness of the congressional commentary concerning
the enactment of title VII as an interpretive guide.43
Likewise, these congressional commentaries cannot be dismissed
on the ground that they reflect views articulated prior to final formulation of section 703(h)." The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co." considered title VII's legislative history in construing
section 703(h) and in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 46 relied on
the Clark-Case memorandum 47 in interpreting title VII even though
it antedated the final bill.
IV.

Judicial Interpretation of Title VII

Until recently most decisions dealing with perpetuation of past
discrimination by seniority systems challenged the legality of departmental seniority systems in which employers maintained segregated
work forces4 8 or of referral rules of previously all-white craft
unions. 49 Following the reasoning of Griggs v. Duke Power
40. This statement represents the constant consensus of civil rights proponents
of H.R. 7152 as they guided the bill to its ultimate passage. Vaas, supra note 20, at
437.
41. 110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964) (Dep't of Justice memorandum).
42. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Local 36, Sheet Metal
Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
43. See notes 21-31 and accompanying text supra.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970); see Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F. Supp.
1136, 1147-48 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
45. 401 U.S.424, 435 (1971).
46. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
47. 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964); see note 27 supra.
48. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Jacksonville Term. Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971);
Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969). In these cases courts found that the minorities involved were frozen into
the status quo by the continued use of departmental or job seniority as criteria for
transfer and promotion. See note 16 supra.
49. United States v. Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969); EEOC v. Plumbers Local 189, 311 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Dobbins v.
Local 212, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). In these
cases the referral rules were found to be discriminatory. Blacks were unable to gain
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Co.,5 ° courts consistently have held that seniority practices, however
neutral on their face, are unlawful when, due to prior exclusion of
minorities from the department or union in question, the practices
continue to relegate minorities "into lower-paying, non-skill departments and jobs. . .. "51
Furthermore, early decisions conformed to the congressional
intent of section 703(h) 52 by holding that only bona fide seniority
systems are protected.53 "Section 703(h) expressly states the seniority system must be bona fide. The purpose of the act is to eliminate
racial discrimination in covered employment. Obviously one characteristic of a bona fide seniority system must be lack of discrimina-

tion. ' 54 Nothing in section 703(h) or its legislative history suggests

that a racially discriminatory seniority system is bona fide under the
Act if "the effect of the standard is to lock the victims of racial
prejudice into an inferior position." 55
These early decisions also discussed the legitimacy of employment or plant seniority. 5" In Local 189, United Papermakers &
Paperworkers v. United States57 the court's holding that not all "but
positions because of their prior exclusion from the employment pool. See note 16
supra.
50. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see note 9 and accompanying text supra.
51. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 236 (5th Cir.
1974). In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796 (4th Cir. 1971), the court
said, "[Wlhile a new department may offer a better long-range future, the immediate
effect of transferring is acceptance of a substantial reduction in rate of pay possibly
for an extended period."
52. See notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
53. The court in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D.
Va. 1968), held that the legislative history made no express statements concerning
departmental seniority, only plant seniority. The court noted that although Congress
did not intend to require "reverse discrimination," neither did it intend to freeze an
entire generation of Blacks into discriminatory patterns that existed before the Act.
See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination,and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1260, 1271 (1967).
54. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Va. 1968).
55. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980, 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
56. When departmental seniority has been at issue, plant seniority has been
considered an adequate remedy to put victims of past discrimination in their "rightful
place."
A 'rightful place' theory stands between a complete purge of 'but for'
effects [and] maintenance of the status quo. The Act should be construed
to prohibit the future awarding of vacant jobs on the basis of a seniority
system that 'locks in' prior racial classification. [But] [wihite incumbent
workers should not be bumped out of their present positions by Negroes
with greater plant seniority; plant seniority should be asserted only with respect to new job openings. This solution accords with the purpose and history of the legislation.
Id. at 988.
57. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).

for" consequences of pre-Act discrimination warranted relief under
title VII implied that employment seniority was to receive judicial
protection.
No doubt, Congress, to prevent 'reverse discrimination'
meant to protect certain seniority rights that could not have existed but for previous racial discrimination. For example a
Negro who had been rejected by an employer on racial grounds
before the passage of the Act could not, after being hired, claim
to outrank whites who had been hired before him but after his
original rejection, even though the Negro might have had senior
status but for the past discrimination. 58
To conclude otherwise would be tantamount to granting fictional
seniority to newly hired minorities or women, a preferential rather
than remedial measure, clearly prohibited by title VII.59 In United
States v. Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers6" the court in requiring
modification of a referral system stated, "[W]e impose no quotas, we
grant no preferences. Nor do we deprive any non-Negro craftsman
of bona fide seniority rights."6' 1
Contrary views on the legitimacy of plant seniority, however,
have relied on the Local 189 dicta. Judge Cassibry, in the district
court opinion for Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of
America,6 2 stated that the segregated plant and craft union cases
shared the same principle: employment preferences cannot be allocated by length of service when minority members were prevented
from accumulating seniority in the appropriate unit. 63 Logically,
when an employer has completely refused to hire minorities and
women, the appropriate unit is the entire plant. 64 As a consequence,
58.
59.

Id. at 994.
Id. at 995:
It is one thing for legislation to require the creation of fictional seniority for newly hired Negroes, and quite another thing for it to require that
time actually worked in Negro jobs be given equal status with time worked
in white jobs....
In other words, creating fictional employment time for
newly-hired Negroes would comprise preferential rather than remedial treatment. The clear thrust of the Senate debate is directed against such preferential rather than remedial treatment. The clear thrust of the Senate debate
is directed against such preferential treatment on the basis of race.
Similarly, in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 661 (2d Cir.
1971), the court said that discriminatees would receive no "special seniority rights" or
"super-seniority."
60. 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
61. Id. at 133. The court also declared,
Each such craftsman will remain in the group to which he is now assigned
and will move to a higher group when he has satisfied the eligibility requirements.

We do make it possible, however, for qualified Negroes .

.

. to be

placed in the group where they will have an equal opportunity to be referred
for work.
Id. at 134.
62. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
63. Id. at 1226.
64. Judge Cassibry remarked that it would be difficult to rationalize an
interpretation of title VII that required employers who maintained segregated plants
to alter their seniority rules while exempting employers who excluded minorities
altogether. Id. at 1229.
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an employer's history of racial discrimination in hiring makes it impossible for minorities and women to have sufficient seniority to
withstand layoffs. "In this situation, the selection of employees for
layoff on the basis of [plant] seniority unlawfully perpetuates the
effects of past discrimination."6 5 In reaching his decision, Judge Cassibry felt that certain dicta in Rowe v. General Motors Corp.66 was
pertinent:
[T]he disadvantages suffered by the Blacks hired after 1962 in
lay-offs and rehiring is the direct result of the prior segregated
policy. This is to make Blacks continue to suffer long after
1965, the effect of race discrimination long after Congress has
forbidden it either in current
6 7 application or as some sort of reincarnation of days gone by.
Judge Cassibry emphasized that the inability to identify victims
of past discrimination should not preclude recovery." He noted that
it was not unusual for remedies in title VII cases to benefit persons
other than the original victims of discrimination.6 9 "[C]ourts have
found it preferable to afford a class remedy rather than to tolerate the
continued vestiges of discrimination."7
The district court ordered the reinstatement of a number of
Blacks and required defendant to institute a modified layoff and
recall system."1 The court held that these measures were not preferential or prohibited by section 703(j) of title V1I72 and noted that
65. Id. at 1226.
66. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
67. Id. at 358, quoted in 369 F. Supp. at 1227.
68. 369 F. Supp. at 1231.
69. In United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532, 560
(W.D.N.C. 1971), the court noted,
It is true that some of the black employees in the Affected Class might not
even under the best of systems have been initially assigned to over-the-road
driving jobs. But there is no apparent way of knowing that or determining
now who they would be. A group remedy is therefore appropriate.
See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 660 (2d Cir. 1971).
70. 369 F. Supp. at 1232.
71. Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 8 EPD 9766 (E.D.
La. 1974) (unpublished decree), merits decided, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974),
rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
72. 369 F. Supp. at 1230 n.7. In United States v. Local 38, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970), the
court held,
[W]e believe that section [2000e-2(j)] cannot be construed as a ban on
affirmative relief against continuation of effects of past discrimination resulting from present practices . . . which have the practical effect of continuing past injustices.
Any other interpretation would allow complete nullification of the
stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See note 107 and accompanying text infra.

courts often have required reinstatement or establishment of temporary quotas for the hiring and referral of previously excluded minorities. 73 The court further declared that the modifications were not
ordered to compensate for past discrimination, but rather were intended to prevent its perpetuation and to insure that minorities would
not continue to work "in lower-paying, non-skilled" jobs because of
7
prior employment segregation. 1
Judge Cassibry's view, however, does not properly interpret title
VII and its impact on last-hired, first-fired seniority. The three
courts of appeals7 5 that have considered the issue have held that use
of employment seniority to determine the order of layoffs does not
violate title VII. In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works 76 the Seventh
Circuit held that plant seniority, standing alone, was not discriminatory and that it did not perpetuate prior discrimination. Adopting the
view that a worker need not be granted special privileges because of
his race, the court declared,
Title VII speaks only to the future. Its backward gaze is
found only on a present practice which may perpetuate past discrimination. An employment seniority system embodying the
'last-hired, first-fired' principle does not itself perpetuate past
discrimination. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to
shackling white employees with a burden of a past discrimination created not by them but by their employer. Title VII was
not designed
to nurture such reverse discriminatory prefer77
ences.
The question arose in a different context in Jersey Central Power
& Light Co. v. Local 327, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers.78 The employer, faced with a need to lay off employees,
sought a declaratory judgment defining its obligations under a collective bargaining agreement between it and the unions and a conciliation agreement among it, the unions, and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).79 The collective bargaining
agreement provided for a plant seniority system, while the conciliation
agreement required the employer to institute certain changes in its
73. Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Local
46, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); United States v. Local
38, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943
(1970); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C.
1971).
74. 369 F. Supp. at 1231.
75. Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 516 F.2d 41 (5th
Cir. 1975); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 96 S. Ct. 2196 (1976); Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
76. 502 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1974).
77. Id. at 1320; see notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra.
78. 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 96 S.Ct. 2196 (1976).
79. Id. at 694-98.
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employment practices toward minority groups and women. The
conciliation agreement, however, did not modify the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 80 The Third Circuit
viewed the proceeding as one requiring only the interpretation of
contracts. Upon examination of the agreements the court concluded
that they did not conflict and that the work force could be reduced
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.'
Our reading of Title VII reveals no statutory proscription
of plant-wide seniority systems. .

.

. [I]t is evident to us that

Congress did not intend that a per se violation of the Act occur
group persons are disadvantaged
whenever females and minority
82
by reverse seniority layoffs.
The Fifth Circuit also considered the question when it overturned Judge Cassibry's decision"' in Watkins v. Local 2369, United
Steelworkers of America. 4 The court declared,
We hold that, regardless of an earlier history of employment discrimination, when present hiring practices are nondiscriminatory and have been for over ten years, an employer's use
of a long-established seniority system for determining who will
be laid-off, and who will be rehired, adopted without intent to
discriminate, is not a violation of Title VII or § 1981, even
though the use of the seniority system results in the discharge
of more blacks than whites to the point of eliminating blacks
from the work force, where the individual employees who suffer
layoff under the system have not themselves been the subject
5
of prior employment discrimination."
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
The

Id.
Id. at 700-04.
Id. at 705 (footnote omitted).
See notes 62-74 and accompanying text supra.
516F.2d41 (5thCir. 1975).
Id. at 44-45 (emphasis added).
first 138 men to be recalled by the employer in Watkins were white
employees. This raises the question whether a recall system based on plant seniority
can be independently unlawful. One could argue that a recall provision does not
protect incumbency, but rather accords priority rights in future hiring to employees
who had worked in the past. "To permit. . . current hiring on the basis of. . . past
hiring is plainly the present perpetuation of past discrimination."

Brief for Appellee

at 33, Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.
1975). This argument, however, is strained. The Fifth Circuit in Watkins stated,
Although the legislative history of Title VII is practically silent on whether
such a system of recall would be exempt, as bona fide, from the purview
of Title VII, there is no substantial difference between the layoff of employees pursuant to employment seniority and the recall of those employees on

the same basis.

516 F.2d at 52. Earlier decisions also used this approach. In Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 248 (5th Cir. 1974), the court said, "[Tiransferring members of the class shall retain their plant-wide seniority for all purposes
including promotion, layoff, reduction-in-force, and recall ....

." (emphasis added).

See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 118 (5th Cir. 1972).

The Fifth Circuit concluded that "[no individual black employee
[was], because of his race, more likely than his white counterpart to
be affected by the applicable criteria, seniority." 8
In reaching its decision, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument
that plant seniority systems were invalid under the line of cases"7
invalidating seniority systems that "locked in" the effects of prior
discrimination. 88 Judge Roney, speaking for the court, rejected the
lower court's posture that the purported victims of discrimination
need not be identifiable.8 9 Judge Roney stated -that "[d]uring the
working lifetime of these plaintiffs, there has been no history of
discrimination, and none of them has suffered individual discrimination at the hands of the Company."90
The Fifth Circuit's position is substantiated by other decisions.
In most departmental plant cases9 courts have required that a title
VII remedy be extended only to those who actually suffered present
effects of past discrimination. In Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. 92 the
court stated that the class receiving relief would include all black
employees hired in segregated departments prior to the end of the
company's discriminatory practices, "[but] Negroes hired after January 1, 1966 are not included in the class. Since that time the
Company has hired employees in all of its departments on a nondis94
criminatory basis.""3 Even in those departmental and referral cases
in which a class remedy was considered appropriate because individual victims of discrimination were unascertainable, the class itself
was identifiable and present before the tribunal. 95 The implication
of these cases is that a remedy should be extended only to those
86.

516 F.2d at 45.

The court stated, "Age, not race, is the principal reason

the plaintiffs in this case did not have sufficient seniority to withstand layoff."

Id. at

46.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See notes 48-55 and accompanying text supra.
516 F.2d at 45-46.
See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
516 F.2d at 46.

91.

Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 259 (5th Cir.

1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1374-75 (5th Cir.

1974); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 921-22 (5th Cir. 1973);
see note 16 supra.
92.

279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).

93.

Id. at 520.

94.

United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971);

United States v. Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C. 1971); see
note 69 supra.

95. United States v. Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123, 132 (8th
Cir. 1969):
We recognize that each of the cases cited in n.15 to support our position can be distinguished on the ground that in each case, a number of
known members of a minority group had been discriminated against after
the passage of the Civil Rights Act. Here, we do not have such evidence,
but we do not believe that it is necessary. The record does show that quali-

fied Negro tradesmen have been and continue to be residents of the area.
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members of a class who suffered past discrimination, currently perpetuated, "at a time when they were of working age and were
available and qualified . . . ."9 Language in the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Watkins comports with this implication: "Age, not race, is
the principal reason the plaintiffs in this case did not have sufficient
seniority to withstand layoff. All but one were under the age of legal
employment when the Company commenced equal hiring."' "
As further support for the decisions of the courts of appeals, it
must be observed that title VII was intended to function prospectively
by providing a remedy for persons who suffer from discrimination
occurring after the effective date of the Act. 98 Therefore, one cannot
rely on cases9" that established temporary quotas to correct the continuing effects of past discrimination to justify the contention that
purported victims of past discrimination currently perpetuated need
not be identified. 10 0 In the cases correcting the continuing effects of
past discrimination, the beneficiaries only coincidentally would be
individuals previously excluded. In those cases, however, the relief
ordered was not intended to make amends for past discriminations,
but rather was designed to prevent its present continuation. The
beneficiaries of this relief were in fact within the currently affected
class denied employment participation. 10 1 When the Fifth Circuit in
Watkins'012 considered the legality of plant seniority, on the other
hand, it was apparent that the discriminatory continuum had been
broken for ten years.103 Therefore, the lack of identifiable victims of
past discrimination precluded a remedy. "Inasmuch as none of
plaintiffs have suffered individual discrimination at the hands of the
Company,. . . there is no past discrimination toward them which the
current maintenance of the layoff system could possibly perpetu-

ate." 104
96. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 20, at 1634.
97. 516 F.2d at 46.
98. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
99. Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Local 46, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers, 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 1973); Carter v.
Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Local 38, Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Central Motor
Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532, 561 (W.D.N.C. 1971); see notes 113-16 and accompanying text infra.
100. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 95-96 and accompanying text supra.
102. Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 516 F.2d 41
(5th Cir. 1975).
103. Id. at 44.

104.

Id. at 47. In Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309, 319 (M.D. La.

.-..Most importantly, however, the Fifth Circuit in Watkins concluded,
To hold the seniority plan discriminatory as to the plaintiffs
• . .requires a determination that blacks not otherwise person-

ally discriminated against should be treated preferentially over
equal whites. .

.

. The result . . . is not that [of] personal

remedial relief available under Title VII, but rather a preferential treatment on the basis of race .... 105
This statement capsulizes the most persuasive argument against modification of layoffs based on last-hired, first-fired seniority: modification would be tantamount to a grant of fictional or "super" seniority
to minorities on a preferential basis. As the Fifth Circuit noted,"0 6
title VII prohibits preferential treatment. Section 703(j) states,
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted
to require any employer

. . .

to grant preferential treatment to

any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin employed by any employer . .incomparison
with the total number [or] percentage of [such] persons . . .
in any community ....

107

The Supreme Court reiterated this prohibition in Griggs V. Duke
Power Co., stating that "[d]iscriminatory preferences for any group,
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed."10 8 More recently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the proscription:
Title VII mandates that workers of every race be treated
equally according to their earned seniority. It does not require
• . .that a worker be granted fictional seniority or special privileges because of his race ...
Under the employment seniority system there is equal
1974), the court declared, "The Court [in Watkins] did not require a showing that
the individual blacks were prevented from acquiring the necessary seniority 'by virtue
of' prior discrimination, but instead imposed an absolute quota system on the plant."
105. 516 F.2d at 46 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970) (emphasis added). The debate in Congress
also established that title VII was designed to encourage meritocracy and not
preference. 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). Senator
Humphrey added,
The proponents of this bill have carefully stated on numerous occasions that
Title VII does not require an employer to achieve any sort of racial balance
in his work force by giving preferential treatment to any individual or
group. Since doubts have persisted, subsection (j) is added to state this
point expressly.
Id. at 12723.
108. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The Court also held,
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to every
person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command
that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.
Id. at 430-31.
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recognition of employment seniority which preserves only the
earned expectations of long-service employees. 10 9
In an effort to honor this proscription the Fifth Circuit in Watkins"'
limited its denial of preferential treatment to plaintiffs who were not
personally targets of past discrimination."'
Additionally, most courts have avoided awarding unearned or
fictional seniority to victims of past discrimination occurring before
the effective date of title VII." 2
Affirmative relief, however, may be appropriate in certain
cases." 3 To end perpetuation of discriminatory employment barriers, a court can "order temporary one-to-one or one-to-two hiring,
the creation of hiring pools, or a freeze on white hiring, or any other
[appropriate] form of affirmative relief.""' 4 In cases in which affirmative relief has been required, the discrimination was extreme and
the continuum of prohibited activity unbroken." 5 Often the discrimination continued up to and beyond the trial.' 1 6 Recently, however,
the Supreme Court extended the use of affirmative relief to situations
in which identifiable plaintiffs have been discriminatorily denied
employment after the effective date of title VII. In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co."' the Court awarded retroactive seniority
status to identifiable applicants who were denied employment because
8
of their race after the effective date and in violation of title VII.11
109. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1974).
110. 516 F.2d at 46; see note 105 and accompanying text supra.
111. The Fifth Circuit consciously limited its decision:
We specifically do not decide the rights of a laid-off employee who
could show that, but for the discriminatory refusal to hire him at an earlier
time than the date of his actual employment, or but for his failure to obtain
earlier employment because of exclusion of minority employees from the
work force, he would have sufficient seniority to insulate him against layoff.
516 F.2d at 45.
112. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) (emphasis added) states in part,
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or
is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate,which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay ....
114. Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974).
115. Cases cited note 99 supra.
116. United States v. Local 38, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 428 F.2d 144, 151
(6th Cir. 1970).
117. 424 U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 1251 (1976).
118. The Court carefully stated,
The underlying legal wrong . . .is not the alleged operation of a racially
discriminatory seniority system but of a racially discriminatory hiring sys-

Only in this manner could an applicant be made whole and obtain his
"rightful place" within the employment hierarchy. 119 The situation
addressed in Franks is in marked contrast, however, to that in which
an employer has been nondiscriminatory in his employment practices
since the advent of title VII 20 In this situation past discrimination
is not perpetuated by the last-hired, first-fired doctrine and the doctrine's modification is not warranted.
V.

A Separate Cause of Action Under Section 1981

Although plant seniority cannot be attacked successfully within
the strictures of title VII, it is subject to scrutiny 121 under section
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,122 which prohibits all forms of
racial discrimination. Recently courts have used section 1981 to
remedy discriminatory practices in private employment situations. 23
More importantly, Congress and the courts have not considered title
VII to be the exclusive remedy in all areas of employment discriminatern. Petitioners do not ask modification or elimination of the existing
seniority system, but only an award of the seniority status they would have
individually enjoyed under the present system but for the illegal discriminatory refusal to hire.
Id. at 1261. The Court found that "[t]here is no indication in the legislative
materials that § 703(h) was intended to modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once an illegal discriminatory practice occurring after the effective date of the Act
is proved .... ." Id. at 1263 (emphasis added); Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F. Supp.
1136 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Loy v. City of Cleveland, 8 'FEP CASES 614 (N.D. Ohio),
dismissed as moot, 8 FEP CASES 617 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
119. The Court declared, "Without an award of seniority dating from the time at
which he was discriminatorily refused employment, an individual . . . will never
96 S. Ct. at 1265-66 (emphasis
obtain his rightful place . . . ." 424 U.S. -,
added).
After Franks the Seventh Circuit reheard a case that raised the issue whether 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) can be used to interpose a legal bar to the theory that
perpetuation of past discrimination through a current seniority policy constitutes a
continuing violation of title VII rights. Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d
1247 (7th Cir. 1976). In that case a stewardess was discriminated against in 1968
when she was forced to resign. She was rehired in 1972 and claimed that an ongoing
discrimination existed against her because of the airline's continuous time-in-service
seniority policy. The court held that if the prior discharge was discriminatory, then
the seniority policy extends the impact of past discrimination. Id. at 1250. Consequently, current application of a facially neutral seniority policy may be in violation
of title VII if its effect is to perpetuate disadvantages accruing from prior discrimination.
120. See notes 102-04 and accompanying text supra.
121. Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 516 F.2d 41, 49-50
(5th Cir. 1975).
122. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), states,
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
123. See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1378 (5th Cir.
1974); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1045 (5th Cir. 1971);
Sanders v. Dobbs House, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 948 (1971).
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tion. "Title VII is not intended to, and does not deny to any
individual, rights and remedies which he may pursue under other
Federal and State statutes."'1 4 In Guerra v. Manchester Terminal
Co. 25 the court stated,
We emphasize that though Title VII [and] § 1981
may overlap in the area of employment discrimination, their
confluence must not be exaggerated. They are separate, independent statutes. The procedures under them vary; the available remedies may differ significantly; and. . . conduct creating
liability under one may not create liability under another.' 26
Nevertheless, a prohibition of last-hired, first-fired layoffs based
on section 1981 is improper. The independence of the two statutes
(title VII and section 1981) lies in their difference of scope with
respect to a particular problem. 27 When the statutes address the
same subject, such as layoffs, however, "Title VII and Section 1981
are generally enforced together in single proceedings. . . . [Ilt
would clearly be an undesirable result to construct two separate
bodies of substantive law for the enforcement of the two statutes."'' 28
A basic rule of statutory construction is that when two statutes
address the same situation, the later, more detailed provision controls. 29 Applying this rule, title VII's section 703(h) supersedes the
generalized language of section 1981 concerning the legitimacy of
plant seniority. The court in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works 8 °
reached this conclusion: "Having passed scrutiny under the substantive requirements of Title VII, the employment seniority system utilized by Wisconsin Steel is not violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1981."' 3
Furthermore, when an employer is forced to reduce his work
force, a violation of section 1981 cannot be assumed. Section 1981
declares that all persons have the same right to make and enforce
contracts and subjects all persons to the same legal obligations flow124.

110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964)

(Dep't of Justice memorandum).

In 1964

and 1972 Congress defeated amendments that would have made title VII the exclusive
remedy for employment discrimination. 118 CONG. REC. 3371-73 (1972); 110 CONG.
REC. 13650 (1964).
125. 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
126. Id. at 658 n.46.

127.

See 118 CONG. REc. 3372 (1972).

128.

Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of America, 369 F. Supp. 1221,

1230 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
129.

Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 388 (1969); Myers v. Hollister, 226 F.2d

346, 348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 987 (1956).
130.

502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).

131.

Id. at 1320 n.4; accord, Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steelworkers of

America, 516 F.2d 41, 50 (5th Cir. 1975).

ing from these agreements. 3 2 Thus, when an employer has hired
on an equal basis and enforced rights and liabilities, including length
of service layoffs, of employment in accordance with a valid contract, a minority cannot complain of unequal treatment violating section 1981 a
Finally, it is erroneous to assume that plant seniority is discriminatory but protected by section 703(h) as an exception13 4 to the
general prohibitions of title VII. Section 703(h) expresses the congressional intent 3 5 that actions based on criteria other than race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin are not discriminatory under
title VII. Length of service is one such nondiscriminatory criterion.
Therefore, if plant seniority is nondiscriminatory under title VII, it
also must be nondiscriminatory under section 1981.
VI.

Conclusion

The last-hired, first-fired doctrine governing work force reductions is not discriminatory and not prohibited by law. To conclude
otherwise would authorize preferential treatment for groups who have
not suffered from perpetuation of past discrimination. Preferential
treatment is prohibited by title VII because the Act does not require
integration, but only an end to employment discrimination. It requires "the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in order to
satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized."' 36
On the other hand, the adverse effects of the recession on
minority employment can be alleviated. Voluntary efforts, such as
37
work sharing and temporary inverse seniority, can be implemented
to reduce the harshness of the economic downturn on minority workers.'"" These efforts would not be gratuitous because decisions still
may be rendered against employers and unions when the discrimina132.

"[Section 1981] is an equalizing provision, seeking to insure that rights do

not vary according to race. It does not require that persons be accorded preferential
treatment, because of their race." Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 505 (6th
Cir. 1974).

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Watkins stated that "Blacks are guaran-

teed the same rights as whites under § 1981, not greater rights."
133.

516 F.2d at 50.

Moreover, § 1981 was not used in employment situations until 1970 and,

therefore, it would be unfair to apply § 1981 retrospectively to discrimination
occurring before 1970.

Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364,

1379 (5th Cir. 1974).
134. Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 11 n.11, Watkins v. Local 2369,
United Steelworkers of America, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
135.
136.

See notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 342 (1974)

(Douglas, J., dissenting).

137. The EEOC requested major employers "to make every reasonable effort to
assure that those women and minorities who-through your efforts and ours-have
made recent gains, do not disproportionately become the victims of this recession."
N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1975, at 17, col. 5 (city ed.).
138. Bender, Job Discrimination, 10 Years Later, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974,
§ 3, at 3 (city ed.); TIME, Feb. 3, 1975, at 58.
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tion in question has occurred subsequent to the effective date of title
VII.L 1 9 Voluntary cooperation, therefore, could forestall expensive
litigation and reduce racial strife.
In short, plant seniority must remain unchanged. The contrary
conclusion would lead to an unwarranted remedy of a nonlegal wrong
that plagues one class by imposing a legal disadvantage on another.

WARNER

139.

K. DEPuY

See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976).

